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In this paper we contribute new empirical results about consumers’ decisions to avoid cigarette excise
taxes, and a new applied welfare economic analysis of optimal excise taxation with tax avoidance.
We examine direct measures of consumer excise tax avoidance in novel individual-level data from
the 2003 and 2006 - 2007 Tobacco Use Supplements to the U.S. Current Population Survey.  We estimate
reduced-form models and a structural endogenous switching regression model.  In the structural border-crossing
equation, the decision to cross the border depends on the difference between the endogenous home-
and border-state prices.  The reduced-form and structural results show that the probability of cross-border
cigarette purchases responds in predictable ways to the economic incentives created by the distance
to the border and state tax differentials.  To our knowledge, we are also the first study to extend the
formula for optimal Pigouvian corrective taxation to incorporate excise tax avoidance.  Taking into
account tax avoidance implies the optimal tax is substantially below the simple Pigouvian tax that
internalizes external costs.  In illustrative calculations for 2003, we find that in 20 states the optimal
tax that accounts for tax avoidance is at least 20 percent smaller than the simple Pigouvian tax.
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fliu22@gmail.com1The seminal study by Manning et al. (1989) concluded that the external costs of drinking
justified higher alcohol taxes, but cigarette taxes  were already high enough.  Smith (2005, pp. 67
- 73), Cnosssen and Smart (2005, pp. 36 - 37), and Sloan et al. (2004) review more recent
empirical evidence on the external costs of alcohol and cigarettes.  Parry, Walls, and Harrington
(2007) review empirical evidence on externalities related to automobile use.  
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1.  Introduction
Many countries impose excise taxes on alcohol, cigarettes, gasoline, and
environmentally-related goods (Cnossen, 2005).  Excise taxes are relatively small but non-trivial
sources of revenue.  On average across the OECD, they account for almost 12 percent of
government revenues(OECD 2005).   However, it is widely agreed that the revenues are not the
main reason for excise taxes.  As Hines (2007, p. 50) argues: “Instead, excise taxes are intended
to discourage consumption of the specific taxed goods, thereby preventing some potential
consumers from contributing to pollution, traffic congestion, injury, and poor health.”  In
neoclassical welfare economics substantial excise taxes on certain goods can be justified as
efficient Pigouvian taxes that internalize external costs.
1  Recent work in behavioral economics
suggests that much higher excise taxes may sometimes be justified to correct the “internalities”
consumers impose on their future selves by unhealthy time-inconsistent decisions (O’Donoghue
and Rabin 2003, 2006, Gruber and Koszegi 2004).    
In the U.S. excise taxes are imposed at the federal, state, and local level.  In recent years
states have been particularly active increasing the excise taxes on cigarettes.  Since 2000, 47
states and the District of Columbia have enacted 100 cigarette tax hikes (Federation of Tax
Administrators 2010).  According to a major tobacco company, 16 states are considering new
cigarette tax hikes in 2010 (R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 2010).  Cigarette tax rates
currently range from a low of $0.07 per pack in South Carolina to a high of $3.46 per pack in2
Rhode Island. Some localities also tax cigarettes, the most notable being New York City’s $1.50
per pack tax since 2002, and Chicago and Cook County’s combined $2.68 per pack tax since
2006.  Alcohol and gasoline excise taxes also vary widely across states, although not as widely
as cigarette taxes (Federation of Tax Administrators 2010).   In the contiguous U.S., beer tax
rates currently range from $0.02 per gallon in Wyoming to $0.77 per gallon in South Carolina. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, some of the very highest beer taxes are in the geographically isolated
states of Alaska ($1.07 per gallon) and Hawaii ($0.93 per gallon).  Gasoline tax rates in the
contiguous U.S. range from $0.14 per gallon in Wyoming to $0.375 per gallon in Washington.
Consumers can legally avoid national, state, and local excise taxes by making purchases
from nearby tax jurisdictions with lower tax rates.  Excise tax avoidance is a potential problem in
both Europe and the U.S.  Twelve percent of the E.U. population lives near the border with
another member nation (Cnossen 2005, p. 45).  About 40 percent of the U.S. population lives in
counties that border another state or nation (Vedder 1997).  Following Oliver Wendell Holmes in
Bullen v. Wisconsin (1916), it is standard to distinguish legal tax avoidance from illegal tax
evasion.  In most U.S. states, cross-border purchases are legal if intended for personal
consumption.  For cigarettes, this is usually implemented through limits on the quantity
purchased, typically 20 to 30 packs (two to three cartons of 10 packs each). 
Although policy makers in high-tax jurisdictions understandably worry about the
potential lost tax revenues, economic research on excise tax avoidance is limited.   The extensive
body of theoretical and empirical research on tax evasion and compliance focuses almost entirely
on income taxes, not excise taxes (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998, Sandmo 2005, Slemrod
2007, Chetty 2009a).  Some health economics studies attempt to control for legal consumer tax2Chaloupka and Warner (2000) provide a comprehensive review of cigarette demand
studies.  Cigarette demand studies that emphasize the role of tax avoidance and smuggling
include Coats (1995), Saba et al. (1995), Thursby and Thursby (2000), Yurekli and Zhang
(2000), Gruber, Sen and Stabile (2003), Stehr (2005), Lovenheim (2008) and Chiou and
Muehlegger (2008).  Cook and Moore (2000) provide a comprehensive review of alcohol
demand studies.  Alcohol demand studies that address border-crossing include Baltagi and Goel
(1990), Baltalgi and Griffin (1995), Beard, Gant and Saba (1997), and Stehr (2007).  In a related
study, Asplund, Friberg and Wilander (2007) estimate the responsiveness of Swedish alcohol
sales to foreign prices.  
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avoidance and illegal smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol, but these studies lack actual measures
of tax avoidance and their primary goal is to develop unbiased estimates of the price elasticities
of demand.
2  As Merriman (2010) notes about many of these studies, “none of the widely used
approaches is fully satisfactory because they require researchers to infer tax avoidance based on
discrepancies in observed data (e.g. the difference between tax revenues collected and smoking
observed in surveys of the smoking public).” 
In this paper we contribute new empirical results about consumers’ decisions to avoid
cigarette excise taxes, and a new applied welfare economic analysis of optimal excise taxation
with tax avoidance.  In our empirical study, we examine direct measures of consumer excise tax
avoidance in novel individual-level data from the 2003 and 2006 - 2007 cycles of the Tobacco
Use Supplements to the U.S. Current Population Survey (TUS-CPS).  In addition to standard
questions about smoking, the TUS-CPS asked smokers directly about their actions to avoid
cigarette taxes.  We use geographic information on the respondents’ location to merge data on
excise taxes in their home states and bordering states, as well as their distance to the state border. 
Another special feature of these cycles of the TUS-CPS is that they asked consumers about the
prices they actually paid for their cigarettes.  
Section 2 describes the data in more detail and provides an overview of the extent of tax4
avoidance.  Cross-border purchases appear to be the most common form of cigarette tax
avoidance.  About five percent of the smokers in the TUS-CPS sample report that their last
purchase of cigarettes was in a state other than their state of residence.  As with excise tax rates,
the rate of cross-border purchases varies widely across states, from under one percent of smokers
in several low-tax states to about 20 percent in the District of Columbia. The prevalence of
cross-border cigarette purchases as directly measured in the TUS-CPS is higher than most
previous estimates based on indirect evidence from cigarette demand models. 
In section 3 we report results from reduced-form models of the probability of cross-
border cigarette purchases.  The results show that this form of tax avoidance responds to
economic incentives in predictable ways: the probability of border crossing depends on the
consumer’s distance to the border and on the home- and border-state cigarette taxes.  
Socioeconomic factors often play different roles in border crossing than is usually found in
cigarette demand models.  For example, although previous studies find that smoking is less
likely among people with more schooling and higher incomes, we find that border-crossing is
more likely among smokers with college degrees and higher incomes.
In section 4 we extend our empirical analysis to estimate a structural endogenous
switching regression model of border-crossing and cigarette prices.  Depending on whether the
individual crosses the border, the price paid for cigarettes switches between two regimes:  the
home-state price and the border-state price.  In the structural border-crossing equation, the
decision to cross the border depends on the difference between the endogenous home- and
border-state prices.  We estimate that at the sample averages, the elasticity of border-crossing
with respect to the home-state price is 3.1, suggesting that consumer tax avoidance strongly5
responds to price differentials created by state tax differences. 
  In section 5 we discuss the implications of tax avoidance for applied welfare economic
analysis of excise taxes.  To our knowledge, we are the first study to extend the standard formula
for the optimal Pigouvian corrective tax to incorporate tax avoidance.  In illustrative
calculations, we find that for many states, after taking into account tax avoidance the optimal tax
is at least 20 percent smaller than the simple Pigouvian tax that internalizes external costs.  Our
empirical estimate that tax avoidance strongly responds to the price differential is the main
reason for this result.  Regardless of how large smoking’s externalities or internalities are, tax
avoidance reduces the effectiveness of state excise taxes as a corrective policy tool.    If tax
avoidance and evasion directly generate external costs, such as traffic fatalities or illegality costs,
the optimal state excise tax on cigarettes is even lower.
The concluding Section 6 includes a discussion of the relevance of the results for other
common excise taxes.    
2.  Data
Beginning in 1992, the Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS) have been sponsored by the
National Cancer Institute and administered as part of the Consumer Population Survey (CPS)
(Hartman et al. 2002).  Each cycle provides a large nationally representative sample and
sub-samples that are representative at the state level.  In addition to questions about smoking
behaviors, respondents were asked other questions that varied somewhat over the TUS-CPS
cycles.  We use data from two TUS-CPS cycles: the cycle conducted in February, June, and
November of 2003; and the cycle conducted in May and August 2006 and January 2007.  In
these cycles only, the TUS-CPS asked smokers whether their last purchase of cigarettes was in a3The low prevalence of internet purchases might seem surprising, and could reflect TUS-
CPS respondents’ reluctance to report actions of questionable legality.  As Goolsbee,
Lovenheim, and Slemrod (2010) point out, there is very little systematic evidence about the
volume of internet cigarette sales.    
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state other than their state of residence, or over the internet or by other means.  They were also
asked  how much they paid for their last pack (or carton) of cigarettes.    In order to calculate
distance to the state border for each respondent, we restrict the sample to residents of
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).  Our sample of analysis consists of 29,377 smokers who
lived in an MSA and provided valid responses to the questions about border-crossing and
cigarette price paid.   We used Google Maps to calculate each respondent’s distance to the
closest lower-tax border state.  We match cigarette excise tax rates from Orzechoswski and
Walker (2008) to respondents, based on their MSA, the closest border state, and their interview
month.  When MSAs span state lines, we match tax rates based on the respondents’ state of
residence.  Respondents in the Chicago and New York City MSAs are also assigned the
applicable local cigarette taxes.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics from the TUS-CPS for the variables used in the
empirical models below.  About five percent of TUS-CPS smokers report that their last cigarette
purchase was made across a state border, and less than one percent report that their last purchase
was over the internet or other means.
3  Therefore, we focus on cross-border purchases in the
empirical work below.  Table 1 cross-tabulates the means for the other variables by border-
crossing status.  The average border crosser lives about 70 miles closer to a lower-tax state and
pays about $0.60 less for a pack of cigarettes.  The difference between the median distance to the
border by border-crossing status is also about 70 miles (20 miles versus 93 miles).4In a national sample from the 2003 TUS-CPS, Chiou and Muehlegger (2008) find that
about four percent of smokers make cross-border purchases.  Chiou and Muehlegger limit their
sample to the 9,745 smokers with identified county of residence.  Our 2003 TUS-CPS sample
includes 16,745 smokers with identified MSA of residence, and includes virtually all of the
respondents with identified county of residence.  With the addition of the 2006 - 2007 TUS-CPS,
our total sample of 29,377 is about three times larger than the sample Chiou and Muehlegger
use. 
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As shown in Table 2, the rate of cross-border purchases varies widely across states.  For
example, in Kentucky and South Carolina, where the cigarette excise taxes are very low, one
percent or fewer smokers report a cross-border purchase.  These cross-border purchases might be
incidental, for example regular commuters might sometimes buy cigarettes across the border
even without a tax advantage.  Some of the highest rates of cross-border purchases are in the
District of Columbia (18 - 22 percent) and Maryland (14 - 18 percent).  Not only are cigarette
taxes relatively high at $1.00 per pack in these two jurisdictions, but they both border Virginia,
where the tax rate was only $0.03 per pack in 2003 and still relatively low at $0.30 per pack in
2006 - 2007.  
To the best of our knowledge, the TUS-CPS provides the first national estimates based on
direct measures of consumer cigarette tax avoidance.
4  There are a few previous state- or
locality-specific estimates.  Emery et al. (2002) find that 3.1 percent of California smokers report
making cross-border purchases after the 1999 cigarette tax hike, compared to our estimate of 2.4
percent in the 2003 TUS-CPS.   Merriman (2010) and Chernick and Merriman (2009) measure
tax avoidance in Chicago and New York City by examining littered cigarette packs.  This novel
method yields evidence of high levels of avoidance in both cities: in 2007 26 percent of the
littered packs in Chicago and Cook County had Indiana tax stamps; and in 2008 14 percent of
littered packs in New York City had out-of-state tax stamps.  By comparison, the 2006 - 20075Several other studies including Coats (1995), Thursby and Thursby (2000), and Gruber,
Sen, and Stabile (2003) estimate the extent of illegal smuggling of cigarettes, but do not
separately estimate the extent of legal border-crossing.
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TUS-CPS data for these two cities yields lower estimates than the littered pack method: about 14
percent of Chicago smokers and 5 percent of New York City smokers report making cross-
border purchases.   In addition to the legal tax cross-border purchases measured in the TUS-CPS,
the higher littered pack estimates might also reflect organized smuggling of low-taxed and
untaxed cigarettes.  It is also difficult to know if the population of smokers who litter is
representative of all smokers, in terms of their tax avoidance behavior.     
Several studies use cigarette demand models to develop indirect estimates of the extent of
cross-border purchases and illegal smuggling.  The indirect estimates of the prevalence of border
crossing range from under one percent to as high as 25 percent.    The first set of indirect
estimates are from a series of academic studies and consulting reports that estimate models of
state cigarette sales.  Although the details of the specifications differ, the basic approach is to
include variables related to border-crossing incentives in the cigarette demand models.  The
estimated model parameters are then used to predict the extent of cross-border purchases.  Saba
et al. (1995) estimate that from 1973 through 1986 almost all states experienced trivial losses
(usually less than 1 percent of sales) to border crossing.  A notable exception is their estimate
that in 1986 the high-tax jurisdiction of D.C. lost 51 percent of sales to its lower-tax border
states.  Using updated data from 1970 through 1995, Yurekli and Zhang (2000) estimate that
nationally in 1995 only 1.5 percent of state tax revenues were lost to border-crossing.   The
consulting reports also suggest that border-crossing is fairly uncommon (Fleenor 1999, Farrelly
and Nimsch 2003, O’Connor 2008, LaFaive, Fleenor and Nesbit 2008).
5  Stehr (2005) compares9
individual cigarette consumption data with state sales data.  His regression model shows the
association between changes in incentives to avoid taxes and changes in the difference between
consumption and sales.  He estimates that border-crossing effects are very small and account for
less than 1 percent of total sales in 2001.  In contrast, based on a demand model estimated with
individual-level data from 1992 - 2002,  Lovenheim (2008) estimates that between 13 and 25
percent of consumers make cross-border purchases.  Our direct estimate from the TUS-CPS of
about 5 percent suggests that border-crossing is neither as trivial as suggested by earlier studies
nor as prevalent as suggested by Lovenheim.  
3.  Reduced-Form Model of Border Crossing 
In this section we report alternative specifications of a reduced-form model of the
probability of making a cross-border cigarette purchase.  Border crossing is based on whether the
consumer’s most recent purchase of cigarettes was made in some state other than his or her state
of residence.  In the basic linear probability model, border crossing is a function of distance to
the border, distance-squared, and a set of socioeconomic variables measuring age, gender,
race/ethnicity, schooling, family income, household size, marital status, and employment status. 
In additional model specifications, we add the home-state and border-state cigarette tax rates the
consumer faces, and then we add interactions of these variables with the distance measures. 
Finally, we explore whether the results are sensitive to the use of probit instead of the linear
probability model, or to the inclusion of a measure of state anti-smoking sentiment.   Individual
respondents in the TUS-CPS are clustered within 234 MSAs, and our models  include variables
measured at both the individual- and MSA-level (e.g., cigarette taxes).  We use Stata's robust
and cluster commands to obtain robust standard errors that account for potential clustering6The models in columns A - C and E suffer from the well-known drawback of the linear
probability model and predict negative probabilities at distances above 300 miles or so. 
However, these distances are outside the range of virtually all of the data.  
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within MSAs. 
The results for the linear probability models of border-crossing are reported in the first
three columns (A - C) of Table 3.  The fourth column (D) of Table 3 reports results from a probit
model of border-crossing that includes the full set of distance, tax, and interaction terms.  To
help compare the results across model specifications, Table 3 also reports the implied marginal
effect of distance on the probability of border-crossing, evaluated at the sample averages of the
relevant variables.  Distance to the border statistically significantly deceases the probability of
border crossing.  The size of the marginal effect of distance falls at higher distances.    The
implied marginal effect of distance is fairly stable across specifications and suggests that at the
mean distance each additional mile reduces the probability of border crossing by about 0.05
percentage points.  Taking into account the quadratic distance term, the predicted probability of
border crossing approaches zero at a distance to the border of about 300 miles.  Comparing
Model C to D, the substantive results are not very sensitive to the use of probit instead of the
linear probability model.
6 
In the specifications reported in columns C through E of Table 3, a  higher home-state tax
increases the probability of border-crossing, while a higher border-state tax decreases the
probability of border-crossing.  As expected the estimated coefficients on the home- and border-
state tax variables are virtually identical in size and opposite in sign:  consumers apparently cross
the border in response to a tax difference regardless of whether it is caused by a high home-state
tax or a low border-state tax.   A tax difference of $1.00, which is approximately the difference7Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) find that excise taxes have greater salience than sales
taxes as determinants of alcohol demand in both the short- and long-run.
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in 2003 between Maryland and Virginia or D.C. and Virginia, is predicted to increase the
probability of border crossing by about 5 to 6 percentage points.  In the models reported in
columns C, D and E, there are statistically significant interaction terms between the distance and
tax variables.  These results suggest that: when the home-state tax is higher, the effect of distance
is larger in absolute value; and when the border-state tax is higher, the effect of distance is
smaller.  Put differently, when the tax differential is very small , consumers do not cross the
border even at low distances.
Additional model specifications, which are not reported in Table 3 but are available upon
request, explore more possible determinants of border crossing.  In one set of models, we explore
the hypothesis that recent tax hikes have greater salience for border-crossing decisions than
longer-standing taxes.
7  We add to our model an indicator variable for consumers who face a
recent tax hike, i.e. a tax hike within either 3, 6, or 12 months before the date they were
surveyed.  Farrelly, Nimsch, and James (2003) provide suggestive evidence that there may be a
surge in cigarette tax avoidance immediately after a tax hike, which then quickly subsides within
several months.  Our results are consistent with this pattern.  Our point estimate is that
consumers who face a tax hike within the past 3 months are 2.6 percentage points (t=2.19) more
likely to cross the border, which is a very large effect compared to the sample proportion of 5
percent border-crossing.   The average effect of a tax hike within the past 6 months falls to 1.9
percentage points (t=2.11), and the average effect of a tax hike within the past 12 months falls to
1.0 percentage points (t=1.54).   
In another set of additional specifications, we include state gasoline, beer, and sales taxes8Another common specification to address this concern is to use repeated cross-sectional
data and include location fixed effects.  However, a location fixed effects specification is
problematic in a study of a mainly time-invariant characteristic like distance to the border.
Lovenheim (2008) includes MSA fixed effects in his study of the effect of distance to the border
on cigarette demand.  Even though distance to a specific state border is time invariant, home- or
border-state price changes create within-MSA variation in distance to the closest lower-price
border.    However, the within-MSA variation is limited in Lovenheim’s study: between most
survey years less than 20 percent of the MSAs experience a change in distance to a lower-price
border.   
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in our models of cross-border cigarette purchases.  High gasoline taxes increase the travel costs
of border crossing.  At the same time, some consumers may be able to jointly avoid several taxes
when they make a cross-border cigarette purchase.  We do not find evidence that cross-border
purchases of cigarettes respond much to the level of the gasoline tax, or to gasoline- , beer-, or
sales-tax differentials.  The lack of evidence might reflect the fact that in general, gasoline, beer,
and sales taxes vary much less across states than cigarette taxes.   
Another specification issue concerns the role of unobserved state-level influences.  In
empirical studies of cigarette demand there is a concern that state cigarette taxes are endogenous
because they are correlated with anti-smoking sentiment or some other hard-to-observe
state-level influence (Keeler et al, 2001; DeCicca et al, 2008).  Although the decision to
purchase cigarettes across the border is much different than the decision to smoke, the state tax
variables might also be endogenous in our models.  To address this concern, we include a direct
measure of state anti-smoking sentiment (DeCicca et al. 2008). 
8   The measure is based on
responses about attitudes towards smoking reported in earlier TUS-CPS cycles and is similar to
the measures used by Gilpin, Lee and Pierce (2004) and Alamar and Glantz (2006).  The
measure of state anti-smoking sentiment has been merged with several different data sets to
estimate cigarette demand models (Carpenter and Cook 2008, DeCicca et al., 2008, DeCicca,9For example, suppose that there is still some remaining unmeasured anti-smoking
sentiment that is positively correlated with state tax rates.  Based on the economics of consumer
price search (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2006), heavier smokers will search more intensively
for lower-price cigarettes, so they may be more likely to cross the border.  To the extent
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Kenkel, and Mathios 2008, DeCicca and McLeod 2008, Liu 2009).  In these studies, measured
state anti-smoking sentiment is strongly associated with less smoking.  The estimated effects of
cigarette taxes or prices on smoking are also typically very sensitive to the inclusion of sentiment
measure. 
The model of border-crossing reported in column E of Table 3 includes the measure of
state anti-smoking sentiment.  We find that residents of states with higher anti-smoking
sentiment are more likely to make a cross-border purchase.  When we include measures of both
home- and border-state anti-smoking sentiment, we find that a higher level of anti-smoking
sentiment in the border state discourages border crossing (results not reported but available upon
request).  Home- and border-state anti-smoking sentiment seem to play roles similar to taxes in
smokers’ decisions about border purchases.  This might reflect social influences that increase the
full cost of a cigarette purchase in a state with high anti-smoking sentiment, or it might reflect
other unobserved extra costs of purchases.  Comparing the models in columns C and E, the
estimated coefficients on the tax variables are not sensitive to the inclusion of the sentiment
measure.  
It is impossible to rule out all possible sources of state-level heterogeneity that might
create bias in our estimates of the impact of state cigarette taxes on border crossing.  However,
we find no evidence of the most likely source – policy endogeneity bias related to state anti-
smoking sentiment.  We also note that many sources of heterogeneity should lead to different
biases in our estimates of the effects of home-state taxes versus border-state taxes.
9  Therefore,unmeasured anti-smoking sentiment reduces heavier smoking, it will also tend to reduce border
crossing.  If unmeasured sentiment is positively correlated with the home state tax rate,  the
coefficient on the home-state tax in the border-crossing equation is biased towards zero and thus
away from the coefficient on the border-state tax.  More generally, it is unlikely that
unobservable heterogeneity will lead to the same bias in the estimates of the effects of home- and
border-state taxes.  Of course, the biases in the coefficients could be equal by accident, so the
equality of the coefficients is consistent with, but not definitive proof of, the tax exogeniety
assumptions.
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the fact that the home-state and border-state tax coefficients are virtually identical provides
additional suggestive evidence that these estimates are not biased by endogeneity. 
Finally, we note that the different model specifications show consistent patterns between
border-crossing and the socioeconomic variables.  In cigarette demand studies, people with more
schooling are much less likely to smoke, and the association with income is typically negative
(Wasserman et al. 1991, Colman and Remler 2008). In contrast, in the results in Table 3 smokers
who are college graduates are about one percentage point more likely to cross a state border to
purchase their cigarettes.  And instead of a negative income gradient, the probability of border
crossing increases with income.  Respondents with family incomes in the two higher categories
(roughly the upper half of the income distribution) are 1 to 1.5 percentage points more likely to
cross the border.  The probability of border crossing also increases with age: middle-aged and
older smokers are two to four percentage points more likely to cross the border than young adults
under age 30.  Compared to the average prevalence of about 5 percent border-crossing, the
estimated differences for college graduates, higher income households, and older  age groups are
sizeable.
The patterns for many of the socioeconomic variables might reflect two often conflicting
influences: the opportunity cost of time and the amount of automobile travel.  For example,
because higher-income consumers will generally have a higher opportunity cost of time, the15
positive relationship between income and time- intensive border crossing might seem surprising. 
However, research suggests that higher-income consumers have higher demands for
automobiles, gasoline, and traffic volume (Johnson 1978, Kayser 2000, Goodwin, Dargay and
Hanly 2004).  Their higher automobile travel probably explains why higher-income consumers
are also more likely to purchase cigarettes across state borders.  The probability of border
crossing also decreases with household size and is lower for Blacks and Hispanics; again, similar
patterns are found in studies of the demand for automobiles and gasoline (Kayser 2000). 
Although we do not find strong patterns for consumers who are unemployed or out of the labor
force, border-crossing among retirees is estimated to be about one percentage point more likely,
consistent with a lower opportunity cost of time.     
4.  Endogenous Switching Regression Model 
An Empirical Model of Border-Crossing and Cigarette Prices
In this section we estimate a structural endogenous switching regression model of 
border- crossing and cigarette prices in two regimes: the home price (P
H)and the border price
(P
B). Depending on whether individual i crosses the border (Bi = 0 or 1), the price paid by
individual i switches between the two regimes: 
(1a)   Pi
H =  $1  + $2 Xi  + ,i
H if  Bi = 0
(1b)   Pi
B =  (1  + (2 Xi + ,i
B if  Bi = 1
The individual is assumed to make cross-border purchases of cigarettes if doing so
increases his or her utility.  Assume  the individual receives utility from a composite
consumption good g,  disutility from miles of distance traveled m, and utility from cigarette
consumption c.  The latent utility difference behind the observed border-crossing decision is
given by:16
(2) ) u = u (g*, m*, c*) - u (g**, m**, c**)  
where g*, m*, and c* are the optimal choices given border crossing and g**, m**, and c** are
the optimal choices given no border crossing.  
To develop an empirical version of equation (2), consider a first-order Taylor series
approximation of the utility function:
(3) u (g* + )g, m* + )m, c* +  )c) = u (g*, m*, c*) + ug  )g + um  )m + r
where ug and um are partial derivatives of the utility function and r is the remainder term for the
Taylor series approximation (including the terms related to )c).  Because g is the composite
consumption good, the difference between the optimal choice of g with and without border-
crossing is simply the potential savings from purchasing less expensive cigarettes across the
border:  )g = g* - g** = c (P
B - P
H ).  The difference between the optimal choice of m with and
without border crossing is the distance to the border:  )m = m* - m** = miles to the border. 
Making these substitutions and plugging equation (3) into (2) thus yields:
(4) )u = ug c (P
B - P
H ) + um (miles to the border) + r 
Equation (4) motivates the structural equation for the latent utility difference behind
observed border-crossing:
(5) )u  = *0 + *1 (Pi
B - Pi
H ) + *2 (miles to the border)i + *3 Wi + .i
The Taylor series remainder term r in equation (4) is captured in equation (5) by the
constant term, the vector of exogenous variables W, and the error term ..   The empirical model
reported below includes quadratic terms and interaction terms corresponding to a second-order
Taylor series approximation; the higher order terms are suppressed in equation (5) for
expositional ease.  The use of a Taylor series approximation is justified on the grounds that
border crossing to purchase lower-price cigarettes results in small changes relative to the typical10The parameters in discrete choice models based on random utility maximization have
analogous interpretations (Train 2003, Small, Winston and Yan 2005).  
11In environmental economics  the travel cost method is used to estimate consumers’
willingness to pay for public goods such as recreation sites (Freeman 1979).   Studies that use
this method typically begin with an assumption about the cost of travel to the recreation site. 
The studies then use consumers’ revealed preferences to incur the assumed travel costs to
estimate the value of the recreation site.    In contrast, instead of making an assumption about
travel costs, we examine revealed preferences to infer consumers’ values for distance traveled.
12Our estimation method follows Maddala (1983, pp. 236 - 239).  Lee (1978) and Willis
and Rosen (1979) are seminal examples that use this method to estimate structural endogenous
switching models.
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consumer’s total purchases of all goods and total travel for all purposes.   
Comparing equation (5) to (4) reveals that the ratio of the estimated coefficients  *2 /  *1
is proportional to the ratio of the marginal utility of distance over the marginal utility of the
composite consumption good.  As a result, the ratio *2 /  *1 provides an estimate of the shadow
price of distance, i.e. the dollar value of a marginal change in distance.
10   In essence, the price
savings required to induce consumers at different distances to cross the border reveals consumer 
preferences for the non-market good “distance traveled.”
11  
To estimate the model, we use the standard assumption that the error terms  ,i
H, ,i
B, and
.i have a trivariate normal distribution with non-zero covariances.  The model is estimated by
maximum likelihood using Stata's command movestay.  Stata’s movestay command yields
estimates of the price equations (1a) and (1b) and a reduced-form version of the border-crossing
equation that does not include the endogenous price variables on the right hand side.    We use
the estimated price equations to predict P
H and P
B for each smoker in the sample.  We then
estimate the structural border-crossing equation as a function of the predicted price differential
P
B - P
H and the other explanatory variables.
12 13These exclusion restrictions meet the identification conditions described by Maddala
(1983, p. 239).
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The structural endogenous switching model is identified by differences in the vectors of
explanatory variables in equations (5), (1a) and (1b).  Specifically, the exclusion restrictions are
that: distance and distance-squared only enter the border-crossing equation (5); and the home-
and border-state tax variables only enter the home- and border-state price equations (1a) and
(1b), respectively.
13  
The exclusion restrictions are supported by the argument that there is enough competition
in retail cigarette markets so that within each state the price is driven down to approximately the
retailers’ marginal cost plus the state tax rate.  This implies that the consumer’s distance to the
border does not directly enter the price equations (1a) and (1b).  It also implies that retailers in
the home state can not change their prices in response to border-state taxes, and vice versa. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that retail cigarette markets are instead equilibrated by changes in
the volume of cigarette sales and the entry and exit of cigarette retailers.  For example, Fleenor
(1998, p. 5) relates that after the 1995 Michigan cigarette tax increase: “One Michigan
convenience store located approximately four miles from the Indiana border lost 98 percent of its
cigarette carton sales....”   Efrati (2007) relates more recent anecdotes along these lines,
including a fivefold increase in cigarette sales in Sunland Park, New Mexico after a cigarette tax
hike across the border in El Paso, Texas.  These large swings in the volume of sales are
consistent with price-taking behavior within a state where retailers near borders can not change
their prices in response to border-state taxes.  To further explore the issue empirically in the
TUS-CPS data, we examine the geographic patterns of cigarette prices paid by consumers who
purchased their cigarettes in their home state.  Prices do not vary systematically with distance to14Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) find mixed evidence about whether the effects of
gasoline taxes on prices depend on the distance from the border.  Although they conclude that
their results are “generally consistent wit the effect of the tax extending across state borders” (p.
880), there are important differences between the retail market for gasoline they study, and the
retail market for cigarettes.  In particular, because convenience stores and other cigarette retailers
sell a variety of products, entry and exit is relatively easy and large swings in sales volume are
feasible.  In contrast, the fixed costs of gasoline storage tanks and pumps create more frictions in
the retail market for gasoline.     
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the border of states with either lower or higher cigarette taxes.
14   
Regarding the strength of our identification strategy, in ordinary least squares models of 
reduced-form versions of equations (5), (1a), and (1b), the F-statistics on the identifying
variables are 25.8, 388.5, and 9.2 respectively.  We are unaware of specific tests of weak
identification in the endogenous switching model.  The values for the F-statistics in two of the
reduced-forms exceed the common rule of thumb for linear instrumental variables models that
the F-statistic on the excluded IVs should be greater than 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997, Stock,
Wright, and Yogo 2002).  The F-statistic for the border-state tax variable suggests that this might
be marginally weak, perhaps due to the much smaller sample size of border crossers whom we
can observe paying the border price.
Results
Table 4 reports estimates of the structural endogenous switching model.  The probability
of border crossing is estimated to decrease with distance from the border and to increase with the
differential between home- and border-state cigarette prices.    The marginal effect of distance is
around -0.07, somewhat larger (in absolute value) than the reduced-form results.  
We use the estimated marginal effect of the price differential to calculate that the cross-
price elasticity 0
B = 3.1.   This is a “cross” price elasticity in two senses.  First,  0
B shows the15We define 0
B = [M Pr {B = 1}/ M P
H ] [P
H / Pr{B=1}] and calculate it at the sample
average P
H and Pr{B=1}.  Because we model the border-crossing decision as a function of the
price differential (P
H - P
B), it might seem more natural to use the results to calculate the price
elasticity of the probability of border crossing with respect to the price differential, instead of
with respect to the home-state price (P
H).  We define  0
B with respect to P
H to facilitate
comparisons with previous research and to use in the formula for the optimal Pigouvian tax rate
we develop in section 5.  The comparison of  0
B with respect to P
H and the elasticity of border-
crossing with respect to the price differential is straight-forward.  The partial derivative terms are
the same, because holding P
B constant, [M Pr {B = 1}/ M P
H ]= [M Pr {B = 1}/ M (P
H - P
B )].  The
next term is adjusted to express the marginal change as a percentage of the price differential
rather than the home-price level.  So the elasticity of border-crossing with respect to the price




H) = (3.1) (0.63/3.54) = 0.55.
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elasticity of the probability of border crossing with respect to the home-state price of cigarettes.
15 
Recall that the baseline level of cross-border purchases is five percent.  Our elasticity estimate
implies that a 10 percent increase in the home-state price, holding the border-state price constant,
increases the probability of border crossing by 1.55 percentage points (31 percent of 5 percent).
Second,  0
B is also a cross-price elasticity in the sense that it shows the elasticity of
border-state purchases with respect to the home-state price.   To see this interpretation, note that
border-state purchases are the product of the probability of border-crossing times the quantity
purchased conditional on having crossed the border.  We assume that conditional upon having
crossed the border, the quantity purchased across the border does not depend on the home-state
price.  As a result, the elasticity of border-state purchases equals the elasticity of the probability
of border-crossing.   In an exercise described more completely in the Appendix, we combine our
estimate that 0
B = 3.1 with a benchmark estimate that the price-elasticity of home-state
purchases is -0.8 (Coats 1995).   Our exercise shows that if a 10 percent price increase causes
home-state purchases to fall by 8 percent, after taking into account the increase in border-state16In 2003 the Internal Revenue Service allowed taxpayers to deduct business mileage at
$0.36 per mile, while the American Automobile Association  estimated the average operating
and ownership costs of driving a new car at $0.52 per mile (AAA 2003).   Adding the value of 
time increases travel costs by at least $0.10 to $0.20 per mile (Victoria Transport Policy Institute
2008), leading to an estimate that the total travel costs might be as high as $0.70 per mile.  This
might over-state the marginal costs of travel, for example some of the costs of owning and
operating a car are sunk costs.  
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purchases, home-state cigarette consumption only falls by 6.1 percent.  Put differently, border-
crossing accounts for almost one quarter of the response of home-state purchases to changes in
the home-state price.   This is smaller than several previous estimates, but those estimates mainly
reflect illegal smuggling instead of legal tax avoidance (Gruber, Sen, and Stabile  2003, Stehr
2005, and Lovenheim 2008). 
Turning to other results in Table 4, the ratio of the marginal effect of distance to the
marginal effect of the price differential provides an estimate of the shadow price of distance
traveled.   The shadow price calculation also requires an estimate of the quantity of cigarettes
purchased (c in equation 4) .  If we assume the average border crosser purchases a carton of 10
packs of cigarettes per trip, and that distance traveled on a round trip is twice the distance to the
border, the implied shadow price of distance is $0.08 per mile.  For sensitivity analysis:  if the
average purchase is 3 cartons (the legal maximum in a number of states), the implied shadow
price is $0.24 per mile.    
Our estimates of the shadow price of distance traveled are lower than standard estimates
of travel costs, but this is reasonable if consumer travel jointly produces cross-border cigarette
purchases and other activities.  Piecing together several sources, a standard estimate of travel
costs might be around $0.70 per mile.
16  Suppose the consumer makes travel decisions by
comparing the total travel cost per mile to the total benefits, where the value of the total benefits22
equals the sum of the values placed on the various services that jointly flow from the travel.  
Our approach isolates one component of the total value.  Many consumers jointly produce cross-
border cigarette purchases with activities like shopping for other goods, commuting, or
recreation.  If the value of the total benefits is $0.70 per mile, our estimate that the value
component due to cross-border cigarette purchases is only $0.08 per mile out suggests that
consumers derive $0.62 per mile of benefits from these other activities.
Table 4 also shows estimates of the determinants of the prices consumers pay for
cigarettes in the home- and border-state regimes.  We estimate that the home-state tax is passed
through to the home-state price at a rate of about 0.87.  Most previous studies find that cigarette
taxes are passed through at a rate of slightly above 1.0 (Barzel 1976, Johnson 1978, Sumner and
Ward 1981, Keeler et al. 1996, and Delipalla and O'Donnell 2001).  In sharper contrast to
previous estimates, we estimate that the border-state cigarette tax is passed through to the
border-state price at a rate of about 0.40.  One explanation is that border crossers are more likely
to obtain volume discounts by purchasing cigarettes by the carton instead of the pack.   DeCicca,
Kenkel and Liu (2010) find that taxes are passed through at lower rates to the prices paid by
carton-buyers.
The results in Table 4 suggest that some socioeconomic factors have similar effects on
the probability of border crossing and on the price paid for cigarettes in either regime.  For
example, smokers with higher incomes are more likely to cross the border, and they pay higher
prices for their cigarettes either at home or in the border state.  It should be kept in mind that the
TUS-CPS did not ask respondents about which brand of cigarettes they purchased.    Previous
research suggests that younger smokers, smokers with higher incomes, and smokers with more
schooling  are more likely to purchase the higher-priced premium brand cigarettes (Cummings et17State budgets are not precisely “members of society.”  The implicit assumption is that
when tax revenues fall, either other taxes are raised or government programs are cut.  To re-state
the transfer more precisely: the losses to other taxpayers, or the losses to the beneficiaries of
state government spending, are gains for cigarette taxpayers.  
18As we noted in the introduction, a common justification for excise taxes is that they
reduce socially undesirable consumption.  In some cases this justification relies on merit good
arguments (Besley 1988, Schroyen 2005).   For cigarettes, the externality argument seems more
relevant than the merit good argument.
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al. 1997, Hyland et al. 2005, Office of Applied Studies Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration 2007).  The patterns across socioeconomic groups for the prices paid for
cigarettes reflect these differences in brand or quality preference.   
5.  Implications of Excise Tax Avoidance for State Tax Policy 
Tax Avoidance and Optimal Taxation
In this section, we discuss the implications of tax avoidance for applied welfare economic
analysis of state cigarette taxes.  In state policy debates, the most common concern is that tax
avoidance reduces tax revenues.  Of course, taking a somewhat broader perspective, some of the
higher-tax states’ revenue losses are revenue gains for neighboring lower-tax states. Applied
welfare economics takes a still broader perspective and focuses on the impact of taxes on the
welfare of all members of society, not state budgets.  Typically from this perspective when tax
revenues fall it is simply a transfer: the losses to state budgets are gains for the taxpayers.
17 
From the broad social welfare perspective, cigarette excise taxes are justified as a Pigouvian
solution to the negative externalites from secondhand smoke, third-party medical costs for
smoking-related illnesses, and so on (Sloan et al. 2004).
18   Consequently, we next consider the
implications of tax avoidance for the optimal corrective Pigouvian tax rate.   
In the Appendix we sketch a simple general equilibrium model that provides an24
expression for social welfare as a function of the home state cigarette tax. We follow the
approach of Chetty (2009b), who provides a useful exposition of Harberger’s (1964) measure of
the welfare cost of an excise tax.  We extend the Harberger/Chetty model in two ways: we
assume that the taxed good, cigarettes, imposes external costs of $E
C per pack; and we assume
that the smoker can consume home-state cigarettes (c
H ) or border-state cigarettes (c
B ).  We
consider the case of a home state that borders a state where the cigarette tax is too low to correct
for the external costs of smoking: T
B <  E
C .  Following Harberger and Chetty, the thought
experiment is to raise the home-state tax T
H while returning home-state tax revenues to the
taxpayer and adjusting for border-state tax revenues via lump sum transfers.  Appendix equation
(A4) provides the expression for social welfare (W) as a function of the home-state tax  T
H . 
Applying the envelope theorem when we differentiate our expression for social welfare yields














Equation (6) is an example of what Chetty (2009b) calls the “sufficient statistic”
approach to applied welfare economics: it shows the welfare consequences of the excise tax as a
function of high-level elasticities rather than deep structural parameters.  The first two terms of
equation (6) reflect the standard tradeoff in Pigouvian taxation.  Integrated over a change in tax,
the first term is the Harberger triangle of excess tax burden for cigarette consumers.  The second
term is the social gain from reducing the negative externalities.  The third term in equation (6) is
the social welfare loss that stems from interactions between the home-state and border-state
cigarette markets.  Because the border-state cigarette tax is below the external cost of smoking,
there is a welfare loss when an increase in the home-state tax increases border-state cigarette25
purchases.  Chetty (2009b) and Goulder and Williams (2003) stress a point also made in
Harberger’s (1964) original work: in an n-th best world with many distorted markets, the excess
burden of a new tax reflects general equilibrium interactions with the other distorted markets. 
Goulder and Williams show that the interactions will be important for excess burden calculations
for goods that are strong complements to or substitutes for the newly taxed good.  Our case is an
extreme version: except for the need to travel across the border, cigarettes purchased in the
home-state and border-state are perfect substitutes.  The border-state cigarette market is distorted
not by the presence of a tax, but by the fact that the tax is not high enough to correct for the
externality.  (Below, we discuss further extending our analysis to include the additional
distortion created if tax avoidance directly generates an externality, such as traffic fatalities or
illegality costs).   
It is interesting that equation (6) does not include an explicit term for the travel costs of
tax avoidance.  These costs are internal to consumers and fully accounted for in their optimizing
decisions.  Feldstein (1999) and Chetty (2009a, 2009b) discuss an analogous result for
measuring the social welfare cost of income tax avoidance.       
We show in the Appendix that setting dW/dT
H = 0 and solving for the social welfare
maximizing Pigouvian tax yields:    
(7) T
H* =  E
C - (E
C - T
B)  @ ( 0
B / 0
H )  @ (C
B/ C
H)
If there are no opportunities for tax avoidance and 0
B = 0, the second term of equation
(7) drops out and the expression simplifies to the simple Pigouvian tax: T
H* = E.   This applies to
the important example of a federal excise tax, unless there is cross-country tax avoidance.  If the
border-state tax is high enough to internalize the external costs of smoking (T
B = E
C ), the second26
term again disappears and the expression again simplifies to the simple Pigouvian tax.  
Equation (7) shows that the home state’s optimal tax rate depends on border crossing
only in the second-best world where its neighbor set its cigarette tax too low.  In this second-best
world, as long as there is some tax avoidance, the optimal tax rate that takes into account tax
avoidance is always smaller than the standard Pigouvian tax rate that simply internalizes the
externality.  In the second-best world, the optimal tax is lower: when the border-state tax (T
B ) is
lower; when the price-elasticity of border-crossing (0
B )  is higher; and when the ratio of cross-
border sales to home-state sales (C
B/ C
H) is higher.      
Illustrative Calculations of the Optimal Tax with Tax Avoidance
To develop illustrative calculations of the optimal cigarette tax T
H* given by equation
(7), we combine standard estimates of E
C and 0




Based on standard estimates, during our study period most states had neighbors that set
their cigarette taxes below the external costs of smoking.  Sloan et al. (2004, p. 255) estimate
that smoking generates $2.20 of external costs per pack.  However, some of these external costs
have been addressed by the current (2003 - 2007) federal excise tax of $0.39 per pack, and the
national legal settlement with the tobacco industry, which is equivalent to a tax of about $0.45
per pack (Bulow and Klemperer 1998).  So we estimate that for all U.S. states, E
C  is $1.36 per
pack, which is an estimate of the remaining external costs of smoking that are relevant for the
optimal tax at the state level ($2.20 - $0.39 - $0.45 = $1.36).   We then compare this estimate to
the current (2003 or 2006 - 2007) tax rates for each state’s border-state tax T
B.   In 2003, 42
states and D.C. faced a border-state tax below the estimated external cost per pack of $1.36.   By
2006 - 2007, only 36 states and D.C. were in this situation.27
To complete our illustrative calculations of the optimal tax rates, we use a benchmark
estimate that  0
H , the elasticity of home purchases with respect to the home price, is 0.8 in all
states.  We evaluate the marginal effect of the price differential on the probability of border-
crossing at each state’s averages, to develop state-specific estimates of 0
B, the cross-price
elasticity of border purchases with respect to the home-state price.  We also use state-specific
estimates from our data for the ratio of cigarettes purchased from a border state over cigarettes
purchased at home, C
B / C
H .  
Using these parameter estimates in equation (7) provides illustrative calculations of the
optimal tax in each state that faced a border-state tax below the external costs of smoking.  (The
complete results are not reported but are available upon request.)  In 2003, in 20 states the
optimal tax that accounts for tax avoidance is at least 20 percent smaller than the simple
Pigouvian rate of $1.36.  The lowest optimal taxes are $0.66 in D.C. and $0.87 in Maryland,
which make sense because of their proximity to the low-state tax of Virginia.  The results for
2006 -2007 are broadly similar.  Because Virginia increased its tax to $0.30 in 2005, the optimal
taxes in D.C. and Maryland in 2006 - 2007 rise slightly to $0.81 and $0.95, respectively.  To take
an example of a state that does not border Virginia or any other very low-tax state, we calculate
that the optimal tax in Massachusetts is $1.09 in 2003 and $1.14 in 2006 - 2007.
Our illustrative calculations show the “optimal” tax in a second-best world: given that
they border states with low cigarette taxes, it is optimal for many states to set their taxes below
the simple Pigouvian rate.   One possible policy prescription based on these calculations is that
currently high-tax states might need to re-consider their cigarette excise tax rates.  An alternative
policy prescription is to focus on the possible gains from moving closer to a first-best world.  For28
example, when low-tax states like Virginia increase taxes, the optimal corrective tax in the
bordering states also increases. 
Another possible policy prescription is to replace avoidable state excise taxes with a
harder-to-avoid federal excise tax on cigarettes.  We consider this exercise in the Appendix, for a
home state with a currently high tax and a low-tax border state.  Under a simple assumption,
replacing the home-state tax with the same-sized federal tax leaves home-state cigarette
consumption unchanged.  The external costs of home-state smoking are also unchanged, while
not surprisingly the new federal tax revenues exceed the sum of home-state and border-state tax
revenues previously collected from home-state residents.  More importantly, social welfare in the
home-state increases because smokers no longer incur travel costs to avoid the home-state tax. 
With the incentives created by differences in state excise taxes, consumer tax avoidance uses
resources – the travel costs – that are deadweight losses, compared to an equal-sized federal tax.
Using our estimated shadow price per mile, we calculate that replacing state taxes with a federal
tax saves the median border crosser in our sample about $0.32 per pack in travel costs that were
deadweight losses to home-state social welfare.         
Sensitivity Analyses
We next explore the sensitivity of our illustrative calculations of the optimal tax to
different assumed parameters.  First, we consider the implications of a much higher estimate of
E
C.  Using a higher estimate of E
C is a simple way to incorporate the argument from behavioral
public economics that higher cigarette taxes might be justified based on internalities that
consumers impose on their future selves (O’Donoghue Rabin 2003, 2006, Gruber and Koszegi
2001, 2004).   Gruber and Koszegi (2004, p. 1980) and Sloan et al. (2004, p. 252) estimate that
the private costs smokers impose on themselves are around $35 per pack.  However, Gruber and19As discussed by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1977) and
Fleenor (2008), the links between cigarette smuggling and  organized crime have been long-
standing.  The president of Americans for Tax Reform, Grover Norquist, recently repeated this
concern:  “By raising cigarette taxes you help fund the mob.”  (Sarlin 2008).  In 2002 a cigarette
smuggler was convicted of funneling profits from a multi-million smuggling operation to
Hezbollah (Horwitz, 2004).  
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Koszegi (2001) show that unlike Pigouvian externalities, because the sophisticated time-
inconsistent consumer helps the government by limiting her consumption, the optimal internality
tax is smaller than the internality costs.  Using various parameter estimates they estimate the
optimal internality tax is in the range of $1 to $3 per pack.  If we increase our estimate of E
C by
$3, from $1.36 per pack to $4.36 per pack, from equation (7) the optimal tax in D.C. increases to
$2.22.  Not surprisingly, the policy prescription – whether the current cigarette tax in D.C. is too
low or too high – is sensitive to using a much higher estimate of E
C to capture the idea of
internalities.  But the qualitative result, that taking into account tax avoidance sharply reduces
the optimal tax on cigarettes, still holds. 
In another extension, we consider the possibility that tax avoidance itself directly
generates external costs, E
A .   These costs might take several forms.  First, automobile travel to
purchase cigarettes out-of-state creates externalities related to pollution, congestion, and traffic
safety.  As relevant examples, empirical evidence suggests that traffic fatalities increase due to
consumer avoidance of local bans of smoking in bars (Adams and Cotti 2008) and teen
avoidance of state minimum drinking age laws (Lovenheim and Slemrod 2010).   However,
gasoline taxes already correct for at least some of the external costs of travel (Parry and Small
2005).  Second, and probably more significantly, illegal smuggling of cigarettes might generate
significant externalties.  Cigarette smuggling has been linked to organized crime and even
terrorism.
19   Shelley et al. (2007) report ethnographic research about attitudes towards “the $530
Man,” that is, the typical cigarette bootlegger in Central Harlem in New York City.  They report
that “Bootleggers were uniformly viewed as a justifiable and appreciated response to the high
price of cigarettes,” caused by the combined New York City and State excise taxes (p. 1486).  
In the Appendix, we show that considering the external costs of tax avoidance adds a
term involving E
A to the optimal tax formula (see Appendix equation A8).  Even though our
empirical study captures tax avoidance and not smuggling, it is interesting to speculate on the
implications of the costs of illegal smuggling for optimal taxation.  However, developing a
reasonable estimate of the external costs due to illegal smuggling would require quantifying the
social costs of funding organized crime and terrorism and of contributing to community norms
favoring illegal behavior.    Instead, we ask a related question:  How high would E
A  have to be to
drive the optimal tax to zero?  Using our other baseline parameters in equation (7), if the external
cost of tax avoidance exceeds $1.40 per pack of cigarettes, the optimal tax in D.C. drops from a
baseline of $0.69 to zero.  In Massachusetts, the optimal tax drops from a baseline of $1.08 to
zero if the external cost of tax avoidance exceeds $2.50 per pack.  These results hinge in part on
our baseline estimate that the external costs of smoking amount to $1.36 per pack. But at least
from a neoclassical welfare economic perspective that focuses on externalities, it seems plausible
that tax avoidance costs related to illegal smuggling might be high enough to drive the optimal
tax close to zero in some jurisdictions.  
6.  Discussion 
Our empirical models of cigarette tax avoidance show that consumers respond to the
incentives created by excise tax differentials across states.  It is not clear that there is anything
particularly special about cigarettes that drives this consumer behavior.  The other most
commonly taxed goods in the U.S.  – alcoholic beverages and gasoline – share some key31
similarities with cigarettes.  All three goods are frequently purchased, which should lead to
similar levels of consumer price search (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2006).  In quantities
intended for personal consumption beer and gasoline are about as easily transported as cigarettes
and involve roughly similar expenditures.  In fact, in certain localities convenience stores offer
“one-stop” tax avoidance.   For example, in 2007 a consumer in Ohio who crossed the border
into northern Kentucky could avoid $5.20 of taxes on a carton on cigarettes, $0.23 of taxes on a
case of beer, and $0.83 of  taxes on 10 gallons of gasoline.   
Of course, one key difference between the commonly taxed goods is that cigarettes are
addictive to virtually all consumers.  Based on insights from behavioral economic models of
addiction, Khwaja, Silverman, and Sloan (2007) suggest that smokers might purchase their
cigarettes by the pack instead of the carton as a commitment device to limit their smoking.  In
exploratory regressions (available upon request), we find that smokers who report that they
intend to quit within the next six months are less likely to make cross-border purchases and are
less likely to purchase their cigarettes by the carton.  Although not the only explanation, one
interpretation is that some smokers refrain from purchasing less expensive cigarettes (across the
border or by the carton) as a commitment device.  To the extent fewer consumers of beer and
gasoline see the need for a commitment device, consumers may be even more likely to cross the
border in response to beer and gasoline tax differentials than in response to cigarette tax
differentials.  A more complete examination of cigarette purchase practices as commitment
devices is an interesting direction for future work. 
Taking into account tax avoidance reduces the optimal Pigouvian tax rate on goods that
generate negative externalities or internalities.  Combining an existing estimate that the external
cost of smoking is $1.36 per pack with our empirical parameter estimates, our illustrative20Studies that suggest current beer taxes are far below the optimal Pigouvian rate include
Manning et al. (1989), Pogue and Sgontz (1989), Kenkel (1996) and Parry et al. (2006). 
Similarly, Parry and Small (2005) and Harrington, Parry, and Walls (2007) suggest that current
gasoline taxes fall far short of the Pigouvian rate.  Both lines of research also suggest that other
policy tools, such as penalizing drunk driving or imposing a vehicle-miles-traveled tax, have
advantages over excise taxes on beer or gasoline.   
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calculations suggest that many states may already impose cigarette excise taxes that are higher
than optimal, and there is a strong policy trend towards even more cigarette tax hikes.  At current
levels of beer- and gasoline-tax differentials there is probably relatively little tax avoidance, so it
might not seem to matter as much for beer- and gasoline-tax policy.  However, previous research
estimates that current levels of both beer and gasoline taxes in the U.S. might be far below the
simple Pigouvian rate (as calculated without taking into account tax avoidance).
20  If one state
unilaterally hiked its beer or gasoline tax to be closer to these estimates of the simple Pigouvian
rate, it could stimulate substantial tax avoidance.  The higher level of tax avoidance, in turn,
would have important implications for the optimal tax rate in that state.  
While we adopt the Pigouvian framework, we recognize that different criteria used in
public economics to judge the desirability of taxes can lead to different conclusions.  However,
regardless of which of several common criteria are used, taking into account tax avoidance
makes state cigarette taxes less desirable.  The Ramsey inverse elasticity rule favors taxing
inelastically demanded goods like cigarettes as a relatively efficient way to raise revenues at low
deadweight loss.  But tax avoidance makes state cigarette sales more elastic and hence makes
cigarette taxes a less attractive way to raise revenue.  In terms of tax fairness,  cigarette taxes are
regressive because the poor are more likely to smoke (Colman and Remler 2008).  Our empirical
results suggest that tax avoidance increases with income.  Because richer smokers avoid more
taxes, state cigarette taxes may be even more regressive than commonly estimated.   33
Political economy models introduce another set of criteria to judge the desirability of
excise taxes (Seiglie 1990).  Several empirical studies of states’ tax-setting policies suggest that
tax avoidance makes the cigarette tax less politically desirable (Benjamin and Dougan 1997,
Nelson 2002, Goel and Nelson 2007).  This leaves something of a puzzle.  Compared to state and
local taxes, consumers have fewer opportunities to legally avoid the U.S. federal cigarette tax. 
Because of less tax avoidance, the federal cigarette tax seems to be more efficient, more
equitable, and is predicted to even be more politically popular than state excise taxes.  However,
U.S. federal cigarette tax hikes have been less frequent and smaller than state tax hikes.   Perhaps
some idiosyncratic effect at work in U.S. federal politics helps explain the reluctance to tax
cigarettes, compared either to U.S. state politics or to European politics that also have led to
much higher national excise taxes on cigarettes (Cnossen 2005).   21We use Coats’ estimate because it specifically applies to the elasticity of home-state
purchases or sales.  Chaloupka and Warner’s (2000) review identifies price-elasticity estimates
ranging from -0.14 to -1.23; Gallet and List’s (2003) meta-analysis finds an even wider range
from -3.12 to +1.41.  Chaloupka and Warner (2000, p. 1547) describe a “consensus range” from
-0.3 to -0.5.  Because the consensus range is based on a variety of empirical approaches, it is
ambiguous whether it refers to the price elasticity of home-state purchases or the price-elasticity
of total consumption, although it is often interpreted as referring to the latter.  It is interesting to
note that combining our estimate of 0
B with a benchmark estimate that 0
H = 0.8 implies a value
of 0
TOTAL about in the consensus range. 
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Appendix
Elasticities of border-crossing and cigarette demand
As noted in the text, because  0
B can be interpreted as the elasticity of border-state purchases,
we can compare it to results from cigarette demand studies.    Using capital letters for aggregate
consumption, home-state residents’ total cigarette consumption is the sum of their consumption
of cigarettes purchased at home and their consumption of cigarettes purchased in the border
state:  C
TOTAL  = C
H + C
B.    The elasticity of total consumption with respect to P
H is the weighted
difference of the elasticities of home-state and border-state purchases:











H is the absolute value of the elasticity of home-state purchases with respect to  P
H . 
The weights are the fractions of total purchases accounted for by home-state and border-state
purchases, which in our data are 0.95 and 0.05 respectively.     
Equation (A1) allows us to compare our results about the price elasticity of border crossing to
estimates from cigarette demand studies.  Our estimate contributes to a growing body of
evidence that while a state cigarette tax hike reduces home-state purchases and thus sales, it is
not as effective in reducing the total consumption of home-state smokers.   As a benchmark, we
assume that the absolute value of the elasticity of home-state purchases  0
H is around 0.8 (Coats
1995).  Combining this with our estimate of  0
B implies that the absolute value of the elasticity
of total consumption is 0.605.
21  Put differently,  border-crossing accounts for about 25 percent
of the response of home-state purchases to changes in the home-state price.   By comparison,
Gruber, Sen, and Stabile’s (2003) estimates suggest that tax avoidance accounts about one-third
of the response of tax paid sales in Canada.  Stehr (2005) estimates that tax avoidance accounts
for up to 85 percent of the response of tax paid sales in the U.S.  However, in both of these
studies, the predominant form of tax avoidance is long-distance cigarette smuggling, not legal
cross-border purchases.  Although our results are similar in that they suggest a strong cigarette
tax avoidance response, we find a much different channel for the response. Like our study,
Lovenheim (2008) also focuses on legal cross-border purchases, but he finds an even stronger35
response and estimates that approximately all of the response in home-state sales is due to tax
avoidance.  
Optimal tax
Our extension of the formula for the Pigovian tax on cigarettes follows the approach of Chetty
(2009b), who provides a useful exposition of Harberger’s (1964) measure of the welfare cost of
an excise tax.  It is also related to the approach used in several studies of the optimal tax on
alcohol (Pogue and Sgontz 1989, Kenkel 1996).   In this Appendix we provide more detail about
the background and steps in this approach.
For our applied welfare economic analysis, we adopt the perspective of a home-state policy
maker setting a cigarette excise tax, T
H .  We assume the home-state tax T
H is fully passed
through to prices, so the price consumers pay in the home state increases from P to P
H = P + T
H . 
The price consumers pay in the border state is given by P
B = P + T
B , where the border-state tax
T
B is exogenous to the home-state policy maker.  
As a preliminary, it is useful to consider the consumer’s optimal choices of cigarettes purchased
in the home state, c
H, and cigarettes purchased in the border state, c
B. In the text we assume that
the consumer receives utility from a composite good g, disutility from miles of distance traveled
m, and utility from cigarette consumption c: u = u(g,m,c).  Following Chetty (2009b), we now
assume utility is quasi-linear in the composite good g, and the price of g is normalized to 1.  We
also assume that cigarettes purchased in the home state and cigarettes purchased in the border
state are perfect substitutes in consumption.  However, purchases of c
B require travel, so the
miles of distance traveled, m, is a function of c
B , where m’ > 0.  The consumer has an income of
Z, and is assumed to solve the following maximization problem:






H +  (P + T
B ) c
B + g = Z
m = m(c
B )
Substituting in the constraints the problem becomes to choose c
H and c
B to solve the
maximization problem:
(A2) max [u ( m(c
B ), c
H + c
B) + Z - (P + T
H ) c
H - (P + T
B ) c
B ]
The first order conditions for the utility maximizing choices of c
H* and c
B* are:
(A3) M[   ] /Mc
H  = uc (m(c
B*),  c
H* + c
B* ) - (P + T
H ) = 0 36
]  uc (m(c
B*),  c
H* + c
B* ) = (P + T
H ) 
and M[   ] /Mc
B = um (m(c
B*),  c
H* + c
B* ) m’ +  uc (m(c
B*),  c
H* + c
B* ) - (P + T
B ) = 0  
] u c (m(c
B*),  c
H* + c
B* )  = - um (m(c
B*),  c
H* + c
B* ) m’ +  (P + T
B ) 
The FOCs have the standard interpretations.  The consumer sets the marginal utility per dollar
spent on cigarettes equal to the “full price” of cigarettes.  Recall that um < 0 and m’ > 0, so the
first term on the LHS of the second FOC is positive (- um m’ > 0): the  travel costs required to
purchase cigarettes in the border state increase the “full price” of c
B.   
To guarantee an interior solution, we assume that the home-state tax is higher than the border-
state tax:  T
H > T
B.   Because of the travel costs, when the border-state tax is equal to or less than
the home-state tax, the consumer (with positive miles of distance to the border) would choose a
corner solution and only purchase home-state cigarettes.  
Still following Chetty (2009b), specify a complete general equilibrium model, with price- taking
firms who face a cost function k ( ).  Following Chetty, who is following Harberger (1964), the
thought experiment is to measure the net loss in welfare from raising the tax and returning the
tax revenue to the taxpayer through lump-sum rebates.   As Chetty explains: “With quasi-linear
utility, the consumer will always choose to allocate the lump-sum rebate to consumption of the
numeraire good..... Social welfare can therefore be written by the sum of the [representative]
consumer’s utility, producer profits, and tax revenue.....[and then re-written to] effectively recast
the decentralized equilibrium as a planner’s allocation problem.”  (This re-writing replaces the
prices in the consumer’s budget constraint with the costs from the firm’s problem.)  We also
extend Chetty’s equation to include external costs E
C per pack of cigarettes, to obtain our
expression for social welfare as a function of the home-state tax on cigarettes:
(A4) W( T
H ) = { max u ( m(c
B *), c
B * + c















We are assuming that the home-state policy maker chooses the tax rate to maximize social
welfare.  The policy maker takes the border-state tax rate as given, but adopts a “national”
perspective and counts the border state’s revenues from taxing c
B as a social welfare gain. 
Although not very realistic, this assumption is in the same spirit as Harberger’s original thought
experiment: we want to focus on the efficiency aspects of taxation, not the distributional
implications (even across state borders).
Chetty points out that the individual treats tax revenue as fixed when making choices, failing to
internalize the effects of his behavior on the lump-sum transfer he ultimately receives.  Similarly,
in our extension, we assume that the individual also fails to internalize the external costs
generated by his smoking.  Both assumptions are justified by the intuitive argument that the
economy has a large number of consumers, so each individual has a negligible impact on tax37
revenues and external costs.  
With these assumptions, the term in { } measures private surplus, while the following terms
measure tax revenues and external costs.
The quick derivation of dW/dT





H]   in the { } can be ignored.  The long derivation is to take the derivative and plug
in the FOCs.  When terms are collected, the behavioral response terms in the { } are multiplied
by the FOCs, which = 0, so they drop out.   This yields text equation (6):  
(A5) dW/dT
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Expression (A5) is an example of what Chetty (2009b) calls the “sufficient statistic” approach to
applied welfare economics: it shows the welfare consequences of the tax policy as a function of
high-level elasticities rather than deep structural parameters.  Chetty also extends his analysis to
consider multiple consumers with heterogenous preferences, and shows that the effect of a tax
increase on aggregate behavior is a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis.
To find the optimal home-state tax, set dW/d T
H  = 0 and solve to find the optimal T
H* :
dW/dT
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Re-arranging yields text equation (7):
(A6) T
H *  =   E
C  - ( E
C -  T
B ) C ( 0
B / 0
H ) C (C
B /C
H)
Replacing state taxes with a federal tax
Another exercise is to consider replacing the avoidable state excise taxes with a harder-to-avoid
federal excise tax on cigarettes.  The exercise is for a home state with a currently high tax that
faces a low-tax border state:  T
H >  T
B .  Consider setting the federal tax equal to the home-state
tax:  T
F =  T
H .  Because the federal tax also applies to purchases from the border state, the
consumer no longer has any incentive to make cross-border purchases so also has no incentive to
incur travel costs:  c
B** = 0 and m**=0.  This assumes the federal tax can not be avoided at all,38
for example by making purchases from other countries.  The first order condition (equation A3)
for the utility maximizing choice of cigarettes purchased c** becomes:
(A7) M[   ] /Mc = uc (0,  c** ) - (P + T
F ) = 0
 ] uc (0, c**) = (P + T
F ) 
With the new federal tax set at the old home-state tax so T
F =  T
H , inspection of the FOCs (A3)
and (A7) reveals that at the consumer’s optimum the marginal utility of cigarette consumption
must be the same under either tax regime.  Under the simple assumption that the mileage driven
does not change the marginal utility of cigarette consumption (ucm = 0), this implies that home-
state cigarette consumption is unchanged after the new federal tax replaces the old home-state
tax:  c** = c
H* + c
B* .  
Examining the terms of equation (A4) shows the welfare implications in the home state of
replacing the state taxes with a federal cigarette tax.  The federal tax revenues collected exceed
the sum of home-state and border-state tax revenues previously collected: T





B*.  But because these are re-distributed back to the taxpayer via lump-sum rebates, this
increase cancels out in equation (A4).  Because cigarette consumption is unchanged, the private
costs of producing cigarettes k( ) and the external costs of cigarette consumption are also
unchanged.    On net, home-state social welfare is higher because the home-state consumer’s
utility is higher with the new federal tax:  
u ( 0, c* ) > u (m(c
B*), c* = c
H* + c
B* ) 
Recalling that mileage of travel (m) is a source of dis-utility, the key to the welfare gain is that
the home-state consumer no longer incurs travel costs to avoid state taxes.  With the incentives
created by differences in state excise taxes, consumer tax avoidance uses resources – the travel
costs – that are deadweight losses, compared to an equivalent federal tax.
Extending the formula to include external costs of tax avoidance
We consider a further extension to include the external costs of tax avoidance E
A per pack of
cigarettes purchased without paying the home-state tax.  These costs add a term to the expression
for social welfare:  
W( T
H ) = { max u ( m(c
B ), c
B + c
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H + c








B ] - E
A [c
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As above, setting the derivative dW/dT
H = 0 and solving for the optimal tax rate yields:
(A8) T
H * = E + (T
B - E
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Price paid  3.54  2.91 
Home state tax  0.95  1.23 
Distance to low-tax state 
border (100 miles) 
1.20  0.52 
State anti-smoking sentiment  0.20  0.20 
Age 15-29 (omitted category)  0.22  0.12 
Age 30-39  0.22  0.17 
Age 40-49  0.25  0.28 
Age 50-59  0.18  0.22 
Age 60+  0.13  0.21 
Female  0.51  0.51 
White (omitted category)    0.76  0.82 
Black  0.11  0.10 
Hispanic  0.09  0.04 
Other races  0.04  0.04 
Less than high school  0.17  0.13 
High school (omitted category)  0.38  0.37 
Some college  0.30  0.29 
College or higher  0.15  0.20 
Family income < 25k (omitted category) 0.32  0.26 
Family income 25k-40k  0.22  0.20 Family income 40k-75k  0.29  0.32 
Family income 75k+  0.18  0.22 
Household size  2.66  2.35 
Married  0.42  0.44 
Employed (omitted category)    0.68  0.66 
Unemployed  0.07  0.05 
Retired    0.08  0.14 
Not in the labor force  0.17  0.15 
Northeast (omitted category)      0.20  0.32 
Midwest  0.28  0.33 
South  0.30  0.25 
West    0.22  0.10 
Feb. 2003 (omitted category)    0.17  0.17 
June 2003  0.21  0.20 
Nov. 2003  0.19  0.20 
May 2006  0.16  0.15 
Aug. 2006  0.12  0.13 
Jan. 2007  0.16  0.14 
N  27,878  1,499 
  
Table 2: Cross Border Cigarette Purchases by State 









Alabama    0.17  2.94 0.43  1.37
Alaska    1.00  2.99 1.73  2.61
Arizona    1.18  2.13 1.73  3.54
Arkansas    0.51  6.24 0.59  11.13
California    0.87  2.36 0.87  1.15
Colorado    0.20  0.75 0.84  1.17
Connecticut    1.38  6.73 1.51  3.06
Delaware    0.34  0.67 0.55  1.9
District of 
Columbia   
1.00  22.42 1.00  18.45
Florida    0.34  1.47 0.34  0.68
Georgia    0.20  1.16 0.37  1.6
Hawaii    1.23  2.38 1.53  0.87
Idaho    0.47  1.65 0.57  2.63
Illinois    0.98  10.74 0.98  9.99
Indiana    0.56  5.92 0.56  4.31
Iowa    0.36  2.67 0.36  1.9
Kansas    0.79  9.57 0.79  6.9Kentucky    0.03  0.6 0.30  0.53
Louisiana    0.36  1.53 0.36  1.29
Maine    1.00  6.94 2.00  8.51
Maryland    1.00  18.3 1.00  13.73
Massachusetts    1.51  15.24 1.51  9.6
Michigan    1.25  6.16 2.00  7.23
Minnesota    0.48  2.24 0.82  8.19
Mississippi    0.18  1.69 0.18  0.95
Missouri    0.17  1.59 0.17  0.43
Montana    0.53  1.81 1.70  3.18
Nebraska    0.64  9.16 0.64  8.92
Nevada    0.50  1.48 0.80  0.19
New Hampshire    0.52  1.02 0.80  1.03
New Jersey    1.68  13.47 2.52  8.62
New Mexico    0.44  3.52 0.91  2.52
New York    1.50  5.87 1.50  4.17
North Carolina    0.05  0.13 0.33  2.33
North Dakota    0.44  0.98 0.44  0.2
Ohio    0.55  4.94 1.25  7.9
Oklahoma    0.23  0.99 1.03  1.32
Oregon    1.28  1.59 1.18  1.08
Pennsylvania    1.00  4.67 1.35  6.58Rhode Island    1.45  8.88 2.46  13.2
South Carolina    0.07  1 0.07  0.81
South Dakota    0.46  1.79 0.86  6.5
Tennessee    0.20  6.25 0.20  2.12
Texas    0.41  1.44 0.74  1.59
Utah    0.70  5.54 0.70  1.61
Vermont    1.02  18.37 1.59  18.66
Virginia    0.03  2.71 0.30  2.18
Washington    1.43  9.41 2.03  9.09
West Virginia    0.42  12.23 0.55  9.72
Wisconsin    0.77  2.51 0.77  1.1
Wyoming    0.28  1.47 0.60  1.99
 Table 3: Reduced-Form Models of Border-Crossing 
VARIABLES  A B C D E 
               
Distance to border 
-0.093*** -0.084*** -0.049*** -0.056*** -0.051***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) 
Distance
2 
0.016*** 0.015***  0.007**  0.008*** 0.007*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Home-state tax 
    0.052*** 0.118*** 0.048*** 0.115*** 
    (0.011) (0.023) (0.009) (0.023) 
Border-state tax 
   -0.063*** -0.138*** -0.060***  -0.136***
    (0.013) (0.027) (0.011) (0.027) 
Home-state tax * 
distance 
     -0.134*** -0.046***  -0.127***
     (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.030) 
Border-state tax * 
distance 
     0.147***  0.063***  0.141*** 
     (0.038)  (0.020)  (0.038) 
Home-state tax * 
distance
2 
     0.033***  0.013***  0.031*** 
     (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
Border-state tax * 
distance
2 
     -0.031*** -0.015**  -0.030***
     (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
State anti-smoking 
sentiment 
         0.048* 
         (0.026) 
Age 30-39 
0.008* 0.008*  0.009**  0.009**  0.009** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 40-49 
0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age 50-59 
0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age 60+ 
0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Female 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.015** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.013***  -0.018***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Hispanic 
-0.009 -0.009*  -0.009*  -0.012***  -0.010** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Other races 
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Less than high school 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Some college 
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
College or higher  0.011** 0.010**  0.009*  0.006*  0.009* (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Family income 
25k-40k 
0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Family income 
40k-75k 
0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Family income 75k+ 
0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household size 
-0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married 
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Unemployed 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Retired  
0.013* 0.012* 0.012* 0.009* 0.012* 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Not in labor force 
0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Marginal effect of 
distance(a) 
-0.055 -0.049 -0.049 -0.037 -0.050 
R-squared  0.045 0.052 0.057   0.057 
Robust standard errors (clustered at MSA level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models A, B, C, and E are OLS linear probability models. Model D is maximum likelihood 
Probit (marginal effects reported). All models also include a constant term and a set of dummies 
for MSA size, region, and survey month. Sample size for all models is 29,377. 









           
Distance to border 
-0.044***       
(0.012)       
Distance
2 
0.007***       
(0.002)       
Price difference 
   
0.095***       
(0.017)       
Price difference * 
distance 
-0.078***       
(0.018)       
Price difference * 
distance
2 
0.017***       
(0.004)       
Home-state tax 
 0.866***   
 (0.043)   
Border-state tax 
   0.399*** 
   (0.136) 
Age 30-39 
0.009* -0.146*** -0.134 
(0.004) (0.020) (0.107) 
Age 40-49 
0.014*** -0.323*** -0.445*** 
(0.004) (0.018) (0.095) 
Age 50-59 
0.012** -0.409***  -0.633*** 
(0.005) (0.024) (0.113) 
Age 60+ 
0.027*** -0.497*** -0.741*** 
(0.008) (0.032) (0.134) 
Female 
0.001 -0.003 0.065 
(0.003) (0.013) (0.060) 
Black 
-0.005 0.272***  0.516*** 
(0.008) (0.027) (0.077) 
Hispanic 
-0.004 0.230***  0.421** 
(0.006) (0.027) (0.177) 
Other races 
0.004 0.057 0.105 
(0.008) (0.038) (0.167) 
Less than high school 
-0.005 -0.011 -0.036 
(0.004) (0.014) (0.097) 
Some college 
0.005 0.034*** 0.097 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.068) 
College or higher 
0.015** 0.192*** 0.281*** 
(0.006) (0.020) (0.082) 
Family income 25k-40k 
0.006* 0.063***  0.081 
(0.004) (0.017) (0.085) Family income 40k-75k 
0.012*** 0.116***  0.137* 
(0.004) (0.017) (0.081) 
Family income 75k+ 
0.020*** 0.228*** 0.392*** 
(0.005) (0.024) (0.084) 
Household size 
-0.007*** -0.004 -0.067*** 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.024) 
Married 
0.003 -0.075*** -0.039 
(0.003) (0.015) (0.080) 
Unemployed 
-0.000 -0.043**  0.079 
(0.005) (0.019) (0.120) 
Retired  
0.016** -0.117***  -0.040 
(0.007) (0.028) (0.108) 
Not in labor force 
0.002 -0.113***  -0.138** 
(0.004) (0.017) (0.069) 








Robust standard errors (clustered at MSA level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models also include a constant term and a set of dummies for MSA size, region, and survey 
month. Sample size for all models is 29,377. 
(a) Marginal effect is calculated at the mean for the sample. 
 